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The First Amendment protects "both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."' In West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette, the Supreme Court held that students have a constitutionally
protected right not to be compelled to perform a flag salute or Pledge. 2 In
coming to this conclusion, the Court stated that "censorship or suppression
of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the
expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State
is empowered to prevent and punish."
'3
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
upheld as facially constitutional a Florida statute requiring that all students
at public schools-from kindergarten through twelfth grade-recite the
Pledge of Allegiance to the flag each day.4 While the statute acknowledges
that the student has the right not to participate in this recitation, the student
can only be excused upon the written request of a parent.5 The Eleventh
Circuit claimed its holding was consistent with Barnette because the statute
protects parental rights; "the State, in restricting the student's freedom of
speech, advances the protection of the constitutional rights of parents."
6
It appears that the State of Florida, knowing that it could not directly
compel a student to participate in a flag ceremony, has attempted to side-
step the Supreme Court's Barnette holding by reassigning the right that that
case protects. The Florida statute requires that a student obtain parental
permission to abstain from participating in the Pledge of Allegiance; this
can create tension between students' First Amendment rights and parents'
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2010; B.A.,
Sociology and Criminology, Ohio State University, 2007. The author wishes to thank Professor Steven
Heyman for all of his guidance and assistance.
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 642 (majority opinion).
3. Id. at 633.
4. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1281, 1285-86 (1 th Cir. 2008).
5. Id. at 1281.
6. Id. at 1284.
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
rights to control the upbringing of their children. However, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the statute without weighing the students' First Amendment
rights and the parents' right to control the upbringing of their children-
thereby implying that there is no affirmative right for students to be free
from compelled speech.7 This is an incorrect interpretation of the Supreme
Court's position on student rights. In Barnette, the Supreme Court held that
students cannot be compelled to espouse a belief or idea;8 the Court later
held, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, that
students have an affirmative right to free speech in public schools. 9 Given
these two cases, the Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit should not
have accepted the State's balancing of students' and parents' constitutional
rights without weighing them.
A student's right to be free from compelled speech cannot be erased
solely in the name of parental rights. Similarly, parental rights are not uni-
versally trumped by a student's First Amendment rights. The Florida stat-
ute considered in Frazier struck a balance between these two independent
rights; this note will address the competing rights presented by Frazier and
attempt to develop a framework to balance those rights. Part I will provide
a summary of the foundation of students' First Amendment rights as estab-
lished by the Supreme Court's holdings in Barnette and Tinker as well as a
brief look at how the Court defined the rights involved in a suit concerning
the Pledge of Allegiance in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.10
Part II will review lower federal courts' interpretations of those holdings to
determine the scope of a student's right to be free from compelled speech.
After establishing that there is an affirmative right for a student to be free
from compelled speech, Part III will summarize how courts have defined
parents' right to control their children's upbringing. Part IV will discuss the
Eleventh Circuit case, Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn. This will be fol-
lowed by a description of Justice Breyer's new balancing approach to First
Amendment Constitutional interpretation in Part V. Finally, through the
framework Justice Breyer has developed, Part VI will argue that the proper
balance of rights in the area of flag statutes leans towards the student. Pro-
tecting students' First Amendment rights encourages the democratic pur-
pose that Justice Breyer extols by promoting discussion that is necessary
for a healthy democracy.
7. Id. at 1285.
8. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
9. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
10. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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I. SCOPE OF STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
In order to have a full understanding of the Supreme Court's position
on students' First Amendment rights, both Barnette and Tinker need to be
examined. In Barnette the Supreme Court limited what the State could
compel a student to dol1, while in Tinker the Court acknowledged that
students have an affirmative right to exercise free speech in schools.
12
Taken together, these cases establish that students have protected First
Amendment rights which include the right to be free from compelled affir-
mation of ideas or beliefs.
In Barnette the Court broke with precedent and found that students
could not be compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance. Previously, the
West Virginia legislature passed a law that required schools to include
courses in their curriculum "for the purpose of teaching, fostering and per-
petuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism." 13 Pursuant to
this law, the Board of Education issued a resolution ordering all students
and teachers to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance. 14 Failure to comply
with the flag ceremony rule resulted in expulsion, and for the duration of
the expulsion the student was considered a delinquent and her or his par-
ents were liable for prosecution which could result in a fine and jail time.
15
The suit before the Court in Barnette was brought by students and
their parents who were practicing Jehovah's Witnesses and whose faith
prohibited them from saluting the flag. 16 In finding the regulation unconsti-
tutional, the Court noted that a student's refusal to participate did not con-
flict with anyone else's rights and that it was peaceful behavior.
17
Furthermore, the Court stated that because "the compulsory flag salute and
pledge require[d] affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind," it is only
constitutional if refraining from participation in the salute and pledge "pre-
sent[ed] a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empow-
ered to prevent and punish." 18 The Court found that, in this context,
students were being compelled to speak without a showing that abstaining
from a flag salute created a clear and present danger. 19
The Court did not limit its holding on the issue of compulsion to in-
11. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
12. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
13. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625.
14. Id. at 626.
15. Id. at 629.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 630.
18. Id. at633.
19. Id. at 633-34.
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stances when the student possessed certain religious views. The Court posi-
tioned the issue within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and
not the Establishment Clause; thus, while the appellees of this case were
refusing to affirm based on religious convictions, the Court did not find that
fact germane and determined that citizens may refuse to participate in the
Pledge of Allegiance on any ground. 20 In deciding that the Board of Educa-
tion was required to act within the limits of the Constitution, the Court
emphasized schools' formative role in children's lives and the resulting
need for "scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individ-
ual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes. ''21 The
Court held that "compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitu-
tional limitations on [governmental] power and invades the sphere of intel-
lect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control. '22
In Tinker the Court announced that students have affirmative First
Amendment rights. In this case, junior high and high school students were
suspended from school for wearing black armbands in protest of the Viet-
nam War. 23 The Court found that the wearing of the armbands was "closely
akin to 'pure speech' which, [they] have repeatedly held, is entitled to
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. ' 24 The Court stated
that students, as well as teachers, do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'25 Like Barnette,
this case did not deal with a clash of student and parent rights; rather it was
a clash of First Amendment rights and the rules of school authorities. 26
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there are circumstances in
which a school may limit a student's freedom of speech, such as when that
speech "would substantially interfere with the work[ings] of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students. ' 27 The Court pointed out that in
Tinker the "school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or
disturbance on the part of petitioners. '28 As in Barnette, the actions of the
20. Id. at 634-35.
21. Id. at 637.
22. Id. at 642.
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
24. Id. at 505-06.
25. Id. at 506.
26. Id. at 507.
27. Id. at 509.
28. Id. at 508.
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students did not "intrude in the school affairs or the lives [and rights] of
others."' 29 The Court explained that the school could not prohibit speech
merely because it did not approve:
Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Con-
stitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit re-
cipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may
not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of ex-
pression of their views.30
The Supreme Court emphasized that the protection of students' First
Amendment rights is especially important because of schools' role as a
"market place of ideas."' 31 The Court stated that speech could only be regu-
lated in "carefully restricted circumstances;" the Court reasoned that if the
government were allowed to limit speech under any circumstance where it
could show some reason for the limitation, the right to free speech would
"be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact."' 32 The
Court's holding in Tinker indicates that students-with an exception for
school discipline-are afforded the same constitutional rights to free
speech as adults.33
In another Supreme Court case considering students and the Pledge of
Allegiance, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, a non-custodial
father sued to prevent his daughter from participating in the Pledge of Al-
legiance at her elementary school. 34 The thrust of the Court's decision
makes clear that students have constitutional rights apart from their parents.
According to the custodial mother in this case, her daughter was not op-
posed to participating in the Pledge of Allegiance. 35 In addition to stating
that "children themselves have constitutionally protectable interests, ' 36 the
Court pointed out that "in a fundamental respect, '[i]t is the future of the
29. Id. at 514.
30. Id. at 511.
31. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
32. Id. at 513.
33. Id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot share the Court's uncritical assumption that,
school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of
adults .... '[A] state may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a
child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."' (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
34. 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id. at 15 n.7 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972)).
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student, not the future of the parents,' that is at stake."'37 Thus, while the
Court ultimately determined that the father did not have standing to sue, it
placed an emphasis on the fact that it is not only the parents who have an
interest in whether or not a student pledges allegiance, but also the child.
38
II. FEDERAL COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF BARNETTE
In Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a school's punishment of a student
for silently raising his fist during the recitation the Pledge of Allegiance
was constitutional. 39 Pursuant to Barnette, the State of Alabama had en-
acted statutes that required schools to recite the Pledge daily and excused
students from compelled participation.40 The court noted that the record
showed that the student's actions were not disruptive to normal school
procedures. 41 The court pointed out that there are two rights, both of which
exist in public schools, within the First Amendment: "(1) the right to free-
dom of expression[] and (2) the right to be free from compelled expres-
sion. '42 The Eleventh Circuit stated in its holding that "Barnette clearly
and specifically established that school children have the right to refuse to
say the Pledge of Allegiance." 43 Thus, the court held that the punishment
was unconstitutional, because "any 'reasonable person would have known'
that disciplining [the student] for refusing to recite the pledge impermissi-
bly chills his First Amendment rights." 44
In Goetz v. Ansell, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con-
sidered whether the First Amendment protected a student's choice to re-
main quietly seated during the Pledge of Allegiance. 45 The court held that
since standing was statutorily defined as part of the Pledge, and Barnette
held that "the state may not compel students to affirm their loyalty 'by
word or act,"' the student could not be punished for not standing.46
Another case that considered the right of students to remain seated in
the classroom during the Pledge of Allegiance was Fran v. Baron-a case
in the District Court of the Eastern District of New York-a suit initiated
37. Id.
38. Id. at 15, 17-18.
39. 370 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11 th Cir. 2004).
40. Id. at 1262.
41. Id. at 1261.
42. Id. at 1264 (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001)).
43. Id. at 1269 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
44. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
45. 477 F.2d 636, 636 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 637 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
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by junior high and high school students.47 It was the students' position that
standing silently during the Pledge of Allegiance was a form of participa-
tion, which they sought to avoid due to their belief that the Pledge is a lie.48
Furthermore, the students argued that being excluded from the classroom
and required to stand in the hallway constituted a punishment levied in
reaction to the students' exercise of their constitutional rights.49 The
school's principal maintained that "permitting a student to remain seated
during the Pledge could be 'a real and present threat to the maintenance of
discipline' and would be 'pedagogically foolhardy.' '50
The Fran court began its analysis with the principle that, "it is now
beyond dispute that the constitution goes to school with the student and that
the state may not interfere with the student's enjoyment of its presence. '51
When reviewing the Supreme Court's position on a student's First Amend-
ment right, the court took note of the need to look at the progression from
Barnette to Tinker; "the original concern [of] limit[ing] the state's power to
compel a student to act contrary to his beliefs has shifted to a concern for
affirmative protection of the student's right to express his beliefs. '52 In
Barnette, the court rejected "compulsory participation as a proper vehicle
for instilling patriotism. ' 53 As in Barnette, the Fran case dealt with an as-
serted right that did not conflict with another's rights. 54
The district court pointed out that while Tinker was not about the
Pledge of Allegiance, the Supreme Court, in that case, gave a rule of gen-
eral applicability:
[for a school] to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,
it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid discomfort or unpleasantness .... [E]xercise
of the forbidden right [must] materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school. 55
Thus, Tinker gave students the right to express themselves in any form that
does not disrupt school activities or infringe on the rights of other stu-
dents.56 The district court emphasized that the school had the burden of
47. 307 F. Supp. 27, 29-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 30.
51. Id. at 28-29 (quoting Theodore F. Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School,
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 56 (1969)).
52. Id. at 30.
53. Id. at 31.
54. Id.
55. Id. (internal citations omitted).
56. Id. at 32.
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proving that, by sitting silently during the Pledge, the students were causing
a disruption or infringing on other students' rights.
57
Similarly, Lipp v. Morris involved a statute that required all students
to stand at attention during the Pledge of Allegiance. 58 The student who
brought suit-a sixteen year old-asserted that the statute requiring her to
"stand during the recitation of the pledge of allegiance to the flag, com-
pel[led] her to make what she termed a 'symbolic gesture,' [and] it violated
her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. '59 The court ac-
cepted her argument that Barnette gave her the right not to stand or speak
during the flag ceremony, because being forced to do either of those things
amounts to compelled speech.60 The court held that the mandatory condi-
tion that the student stand when not participating in the Pledge of Alle-
giance was "an unconstitutional requirement that the student engage in a
form of speech and may not be enforced."
61
A father attempted to stop schools from reciting the Pledge because of
the influence it would have on his first grade son in Sherman v. Community
Consolidated School District 21.62 The Seventh Circuit held that the school
was free to recite the Pledge each day because it was "entitled to hold [its]
causes and values out as worthy subjects of approval and adoption, to per-
suade even though they cannot compel, and even though those who resist
persuasion may feel at odds with those who embrace the values they are
taught."' 63 Even though this case involved a very young student, a first
grader, the court stood by the holding in Barnette, and held the school may
only lead "willing pupils" in the Pledge and no student was to be com-
pelled.64
The Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit considered a statute similar
to that involved in Frazier.65 The Pennsylvania statute considered in Circle
Schools v. Pappert did not require students to obtain parental permission to
be excused from the flag ceremony; rather it required school officials to
notify parents when a student did not participate in the Pledge of Alle-
giance.66 The Third Circuit found this statute to be unconstitutional, noting
57. Id.
58. 579 F.2d 834, 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 836.
61. Id.
62. 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 444.
64. Id. at 445.
65. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
66. Id. at 174 (citing 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7-771(c) (West 2003)).
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the possible chilling effect of the parental notification on student free
speech. 67 The state attempted to justify the parental notification by citing
abortion cases which have held that since "immature minors often lack the
ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate
and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that paren-
tal consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor."68
However, unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit found this reliance
to be misplaced. 69 In finding the statute requiring parental notification to be
unconstitutional, the Third Circuit stated that the "Supreme Court has re-
peatedly stated that 'constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent
or 'chilling' effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct
prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights. "70
III. PARENTAL RIGHTS IN COMPETITION WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS.
This section will summarize how the courts have defined parental
rights. There will then be a brief examination of how States are permitted
to promote their interests through legislation. Finally, this section will re-
view cases that have considered balances struck through legislation, and
determine what limitations are placed on legislatures in this area.
Parents have historically been given broad rights over their families;
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their chil-
dren is basic in the structure of our society. ' 71 Parental rights, such as the
nurture, care, and custody of children, are protected as a liberty interest by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowl-
edged that parents play a vital "guiding role" when it comes to the rearing
of their children, and this role "presumptively includes counseling them on
important decisions. '73 Despite the broadness of parental rights over the
rearing of their children, it is not an absolute right; "legal protection for
parental rights is frequently tempered if not replaced by concern for the
child's interest. Whatever its importance elsewhere, parental authority de-
serves de minimis legal enforcement where the minor's exercise of a fun-
67. Id. at 180-81.
68. Id. at 179 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 181 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)).
71. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968)).
72. Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260,
274 (3rd Cir. 1998).
73. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 410 (quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-39).
20101
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damental right is burdened. 74
While parents have the constitutional right to control the upbringing of
their children, states have a similar "strong and legitimate interest in the
welfare of [their] young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack
of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights
wisely."'75 Given this State interest, the Court has allowed the State "to
adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their
needs for concern, sympathy, and paternal attention. ' 76 In addition to pro-
tecting minors individually, the State may have an inherent interest in
maintaining the familial structure itself.77
This section will now look at some cases which have considered the
proper balance of competing rights. Conflicts involving minor and parental
rights are most common in legislation dealing with abortion. In Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a statute that provided for parental notification of a minor's decision to
have an abortion but did not require parental consent.78 In determining
whether parental notification was an unconstitutional burden on the minor's
rights, the Supreme Court acknowledged the role states can assign to par-
ents when it comes to minors obtaining abortions; the Court stated that
"[s]tates unquestionably have the right to require parental involvement
when a minor considers terminating her pregnancy, because of their 'strong
and legitimate interest in the welfare of [their] young citizens, whose im-
maturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their
ability to exercise their rights wisely. "',79
Similarly, in H.L. v. Matheson, the Supreme Court considered whether
requiring parental notification before the performance of an abortion vio-
lates a minor girl's constitutional rights.80 This case came to the United
States Supreme Court from the Utah Supreme Court, where that court had
"unanimously upheld the statute." 81 The Utah Supreme Court rested its
opinion on the ground that requiring parental notification worked to protect
"significant state interest[s]" that are special to a minor having an abor-
tion.82 The Utah Supreme Court found that the notification was proper
74. Id. at 449 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
75. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 326 (2006) (quoting Hodg-
son v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990)) (alteration in original).
76. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (internal citations and ellipses omitted).
77. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. 546 U.S. at 323-24.
79. Id. at 326 (quoting Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444-45) (alteration in original).
80. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 399-400.
81. Id. at404.
82. Id. (alteration in original).
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because it did not give parents "veto power over the minor's decision, [and,
therefore] it [did] not unduly intrude upon a minor's rights," and it also
worked to maintain the parent's role in child-rearing. 83
The Matheson Court noted that in the case of a minor obtaining an
abortion, the State "does not have the constitutional authority to give a third
party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the phy-
sician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding the consent. '84 That being said, the Supreme Court
has never "suggest[ed] that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may
give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy. '85 Recognizing
that both the minor and the parents have valid constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court in Matheson engaged in a weighing of those rights to de-
termine if the State had reached the proper balance.
In his concurring opinion for Matheson, Justice Powell explicitly
stated all of the interests involved in the case. Justice Powell's opinion
pointed out that there are several significant interests that must be consid-
ered when a minor wants to have an abortion. 86 While there are competing
interests, the minor's "right to make that decision may not be unconstitu-
tionally burdened." 87 In laying out the interests involved, Justice Powell
stated that no single interest of any party is absolute-the minor has an
interest in having her decision honored; the state has an interest in both
promoting childbirth over abortion and getting parents involved so as to
provide guidance to the minor in her decision making process, as well as a
general interest in maintaining the familial structure itself; and the parents
"have a traditional and substantial interest in, as well as a responsibility for,
the rearing and welfare of their children, especially during immature
years." 88
The Matheson Court reviewed parental rights and stated that "consti-
tutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society. ''89 Furthermore, "it is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
83. Id. at 405.
84. Id. at 408 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
85. Id. (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75).
86. Id. at 418-19 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 419.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 410 (majority opinion) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
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the state can neither supply nor hinder." 90 The Court noted that it has re-
peatedly acknowledged that parents play a vital "guiding role" when it
comes to the rearing of their children, this role "presumptively includes
counseling them on important decisions." 91
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Matheson elaborated on the
minor's rights; the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides women with the right to privacy.92 The right to privacy protects
women from "unwarranted state intervention" in their decision to have an
abortion, as well as from having their personal information disclosed to
others. 93 This right to privacy has been extended to minors, and as Justice
Marshall's opinion pointed out, "there are few situations in which denying
a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible. ' 94 Justice Marshall emphasized that minors do not
exist in a constitutional vacuum until they reach the age of majority, "mi-
nors as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess consti-
tutional rights."'95 Despite the existence of minor's constitutional rights,
"the Court ... [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults."'96 This author-
ity however does not mean that a minor's constitutional rights are "some-
how less fundamental ... the more sensible view is that state interests
inapplicable to adults may justify burdening the minor's right."
'97
In coming to its conclusion as to the constitutionality of the Utah stat-
ute, the Court placed emphasis on the fact that the statute "gives neither
parents nor judges veto power over the minor's abortion decision." 98 The
concurring opinion, citing Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth, maintained that "a pregnant minor's right to make the decision to
obtain an abortion may not be conditioned on parental consent." 99 The
statute at issue in this case, like the one in Frazier, has an "impact upon a
minor's exercise of his or her rights;" Justice Powell identified that fact as
the beginning of the constitutional inquiry:-"[o]nce the statute's impact is
identified, it must be evaluated in light of the state interests underlying the
90. Id. (quoting Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 434 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 434-35 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
94. Id. at 436 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979)).
95. Id. at 435 n.19 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75
(1976)).
96. Id. (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75).
97. Id. at 442 n.32.
98. Id. at 411 (majority opinion).




The State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety
of protective measures. Because he may not foresee the consequences of
his decision, a minor may not make an enforceable bargain. He may not
lawfully work or travel where he pleases, or even attend exhibitions of
constitutionally protected adult motion pictures. Persons below a certain
age may not marry without parental consent. Indeed, such consent is es-
sential even when the young woman is already pregnant. The State's in-
terest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition of
restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on
adults would be constitutionally impermissible. 101
Justice Powell's concurrence also stated that even if abortion "is the
most important kind of decision a young person may ever make, that as-
sumption merely enhances the quality of the State's interest in maximizing
the probability that the decision be made correctly and with full under-
standing of the consequences of either alternative." 102 The Court found that
the statute, when applied to immature and dependent minors, "plainly
serves the important considerations of family integrity and protecting ado-
lescents."' 103 The Court explicitly pointed out that the statute only requires
notice to be given to the parent and does not require a minor to obtain pa-
rental consent; the Court "expressly declined to equate notice requirements
with consent requirements."' 10
4
While the Court acknowledged that a parental notice requirement
"may inhibit some minors from seeking abortions," 105 the Court did not see
this as a basis to find notice requirements unconstitutional; "the Constitu-
tion does not compel a state to fine-tune its statutes so as to encourage or
facilitate abortions."'1 06 The Court held that "the statute plainly serves im-
portant state interests, is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and
does not violate any guarantees of the Constitution." 107
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court considered a statute that re-
quired minor girls to obtain parental consent before an abortion could be
performed. 108 The Supreme Court reviewed the district court's opinion that
had found that the constitutional right to an abortion was not limited to
100. Id.
101. Id. at 421-22 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 102-03).
102. Id. at 422 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 103).
103. Id. at 411 (majority opinion) (internal footnote omitted).




108. 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979).
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women who had reached majority. 10 9 The district court held that since the
state passed the statute merely to protect the rights of the parents, not to
protect the minor, there was no justification for requiring parental con-
sent. 10 In its analysis of the case, the Supreme Court considered the special
circumstances involved in a case when a minor's rights conflicts with pa-
rental rights.
The Bellotti Court pointed out that while children are "not beyond the
protection of the Constitution,"'I'i they are treated uniquely under the
law.11 2 The Court found that the special circumstances of the familial rela-
tionship "require[d] that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity
and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children.' 1 3 The Court
reiterated that children's constitutional rights are not coextensive with adult
constitutional rights, and gave three justifications for that position: "the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing."' 14 Due to these peculiarities of children's constitutional
rights, the State is permitted to "adjust its legal system." 115
The Bellotti Court explained that States were permitted to limit chil-
dren's constitutional rights because "during the formative years of child-
hood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them."', 16 Even accepting this role of the State, the State "may not arbitrar-
ily deprive them of their freedom of action altogether."'' 17 One way the
State limits the freedoms of minors is by "requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors."1 18 This allows the parent to
do something the State cannot: to foster ethical, religious, or political be-
liefs they agree with in their children. 119 The Supreme Court explained that
"[1]egal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental
role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and matur-
ity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and re-
109. Id. at 628.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 633.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 634.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 635.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 637 n.15.
118. Id.




The Court pointed out that while the State cannot "lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her
pregnancy,"' 121 it may legislate parental consultation "as immature minors
often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of
both immediate and long-range consequences."' 122 The statute under con-
sideration was found to be unconstitutional because it took too much free-
dom away from the minor girl; it allowed judicial override of a mature and
competent minor's decision and it did not provide the minor with a mecha-
nism to bypass the parental consent requirement. 1
23
IV. FRAZIER EXREL. FRAZIER V. WINN
In Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, the Eleventh Circuit upheld as fa-
cially constitutional a Florida statute that requires a student to obtain paren-
tal permission before abstaining from the Pledge of Allegiance. 124 The
Florida statute states that "[e]ach student shall be informed by posting a
notice in a conspicuous place that the student has the right not to participate
in reciting the pledge. Upon written request by his or her parent, the student
must be excused from reciting the pledge."'125 The State's argument, which
was ultimately accepted by the Court of Appeals, placed emphasis on "the
fundamental constitutional right of parents to control the upbringing of
their minor children and to decide whether a child should participate in the
Pledge."' 126 The student argued that the Pledge statute was facially uncon-
stitutional, the district court agreed and held that the parental consent re-
quirement "rob[bed] the student of the right to make an independent
decision whether to say the Pledge."'
127
The Eleventh Circuit considered two challenges to the constitutional-
ity of the Florida statute: a requirement that students stand during the reci-
tation of the Pledge of Allegiance and the requirement of parental
consent. 128 When considering the standing requirement, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit unequivocally stated that "students have a constitutional right to re-
120. Id. at 638-39.
121. Id. at 639 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
122. Id. at 640.
123. Id. at 651.
124. 535 F.3d 1279, 1285 (2008).
125. FLA. STAT. § 1033.44(1) (2003).
126. Frazier, 535 F.3dat 1281.
127. Id. at 1281-82.
128. Id. at 1282.
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main seated during the Pledge [that] is well established." 129 The court held
that since the Florida statute did not provide an exemption for those not
reciting the Pledge, it was unconstitutional and it was severed from the rest
of the statute. 130 The Eleventh Circuit classified the plaintiff's challenge to
the parental consent requirement as an overbreadth challenge; the statute
"too broadly deters free speech and is facially unconstitutional." 131 To de-
termine that a statute is facially unconstitutional, the court must find that "a
'substantial' amount of protected free speech" is punished, and it must be
"'substantial' not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of
the law's plainly legitimate applications." 132
Even though the Eleventh Circuit cited Barnette's First Amendment
standard that "freedoms of speech ... are susceptible of restriction only to
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may law-
fully protect," 133 it placed primary focus on the Barnette Court's admission
that "the sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual."' 134
The Eleventh Circuit chose to interpret the Florida statute as a parental-
rights statute:
Although the statute here generally requires students to recite the Pledge,
the statute also requires students to be notified that they might be ex-
cused from reciting the Pledge. The statute then spells out how a student
may be excused, that is, by getting his parent's consent. Most important,
the statute ultimately leaves it to the parents whether a schoolchild will
pledge or not.135
This is a flawed interpretation of the statute. The statute does not say to
notify students that they "might be excused," the statute clearly states that
the student has the "right not to participate." 136 However, the statute limits
the student's ability to exercise this right by requiring parental consent.
Under the statute, the students cannot simply exercise their First Amend-
ment rights and assert their beliefs; rather they must tell their parents their
beliefs and the parents then exercise their right. The Eleventh Circuit finds
this law to be one of parental control; however, even accepting that the goal
of the statute is to promote parental control, this statute does not erase the
student's pre-existing First Amendment rights.
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that there was a clash of two sets of
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1283.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1284.
133. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
134. Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630).
135. Id.
136. FLA. STAT. § 1033.44(1) (2003).
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rights in this case, "the State, in restricting the student's freedom of speech,
advances the protection of the constitutional rights of parents: an interest
which the State may lawfully protect."' 137 The court framed the issue so that
students' exercise of their First Amendment rights without the consent of
their parents interferes with "their parents' fundamental right to control
their children's upbringing."']38 While accepting that the government could
not directly prevent a student from choosing to abstain from the Pledge
ceremony, the Eleventh Circuit stated that parents have a stronger right to
control their children's behavior. 139 The Eleventh Circuit "conclude[d] that
the State's interest in recognizing and protecting the rights of parents on
some educational issues is sufficient to justify the restriction of some stu-
dents' freedom of speech."' 1
40
In coming to this conclusion, the court did not engage in any meaning-
ful weighing of the rights involved. Furthermore, the court supported this
conclusion by citing that "courts have limited constitutional rights of mi-
nors and upheld state support of parental involvement"' 14 1 in cases dealing
with abortion and condom distribution. However, reliance on cases in these
different contexts is unwarranted. In cases dealing with abortion and con-
dom distribution, those courts weighed the rights of both the minor and the
parent and came to the conclusion that there was a justified need for paren-
tal involvement in important and potentially life altering choices; here, the
court made no attempt to justify lumping a flag salute in with these other
contexts. The Eleventh Circuit did explicitly stress that their holding was
no indication of how the constitutional analysis of the statute would play
out in the context of "a specific student or a specific division of stu-
dents."142
V. JUSTICE BREYER'S BALANCING TEST
Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has developed a systematic
way of looking at the First Amendment and ascertaining the rights under it.
The cases that have considered the constitutionality of various Pledge stat-
utes have all taken a traditional view of the problem. It is clear under
Barnette and Tinker that, in cases where it is the student's First Amend-
ment rights against the school's or State's interests, the student's rights
137. Frazier, 535 F.3d at 1284.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1285.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1285 n.7.
142. Id. at 1286.
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cannot be overcome without showing a clear and present danger to a pro-
tected interest-such as maintaining discipline in the school. However, it is
not clear that this is the proper approach for cases that involve both student
and parental rights. A new and helpful approach to analysis of First
Amendment freedom of speech cases in the area of communications has
been developed by Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer believes that, when a law
regulating speech is implemented and there are two sets of rights involved,
the traditional First Amendment analysis is not enough and that there must
be a balancing of the competing interests. This section of the note will ex-
plain Justice Breyer's approach to First Amendment interpretation, and the
following section will apply it to the Barnette issue.
Justice Breyer's approach to First Amendment cases is only a small
part of his larger philosophy of the Constitution, which he has termed ac-
tive liberty. In a speech given at New York University, Justice Breyer laid
out the underlying views of his approach to constitutional interpretation.
143
Briefly, these are:
[1] the Constitution, considered as a whole, creates a framework for a
certain kind of government. 144 ... [2] the Court, while always respecting
language, tradition, and precedent, nonetheless has emphasized different
general constitutional objectives at different periods in its his-
tory.14 5 ... [3] the real-world consequences of a particular interpretive
decision, valued in terms of basic constitutional purposes, play an impor-
tant role in constitutional decisionmaking [sic]. 14 6
Justice Breyer's approach rejects the idea of placing "nearly exclusive in-
terpretive weight upon language, history, tradition, and precedent."'1 47
In considering the role of the First Amendment in his view of the Con-
stitution, Justice Breyer uses campaign finance reform as an example. In
his opinion, these types of questions should be approached "with the under-
standing that important First Amendment-related interests lie on both sides
of the constitutional equation, and that a First Amendment presumption
143. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002).
144. Id. at 247 ("It's general objectives can be described abstractly as including: (1) democratic
self-government; (2) dispersion of power (avoiding concentration of too much power in too few hands);
(3) individual dignity (through protection of individual liberties); (4) equality before the law (through
equal protection of the law); and (5) the rule of law itself.").
145. Id. at 248 ("Thus, one can characterize the early nineteenth century as a period during which
the Court helped to establish the authority of the federal government .... During the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the Court underemphasized the Constitution's efforts to secure participation
by black citizens in representative government .... At the same time, it overemphasized protection of
property rights .... The New Deal Court and the Warren Court reemphasized 'active liberty.' The
former did so by dismantling various Lochner-era distinctions .... The latter did so by interpreting the
Civil War Amendments in light of their purposes to mean what they say.").




hostile to government regulation, such as 'strict scrutiny,' is consequently
out of place."1 4 8 For his analysis of a campaign finance statute, Justice
Breyer identifies the competing rights: [1] there is the infringement on the
speech of those persons/groups who wish to donate large sums of money to
campaigns, and [2] limitations on donations to campaigns helps maintain
the democratic process by providing confidence in the system to the public
and allowing the public an opportunity to communicate and participate in
elections.
149
In Justice Breyer's view, the Court's approach should be one that
looks at proportionality:
Do the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their electoral
speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences? Or do they in-
stead impose restrictions on that speech that are disproportionate when
measured against their corresponding electoral and speech-related bene-
fits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and the extent of those
benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to secure
them? 1 50
Under this paradigm, Justice Breyer finds limits on campaign contributions
to be constitutional.' 5 1 While the statute at issue certainly limits the speech
of some persons/groups, the statute is tailored to maintain a healthy democ-
ratic process, and the infringement to some individuals/groups is minimal
compared to the gains of the larger society. 
152
Justice Breyer developed his approach through cases concerning the
constitutionality of statutes in the area of communications. Justice Breyer's
reasoning in these cases lays out the approach to be taken for a balancing of
rights when a case involves competing interests. First, there is a rejection of
traditional approaches, followed by the identification of the involved com-
peting interests/rights, and these interests are then weighed to determine if
the statute under consideration has established the "proper fit."',
53
Justice Breyer rejects the use of categorical standards or strict scrutiny
because
[b]oth categorical approaches suffer from the same flaws: They import
law developed in very different contexts into a new and changing envi-
ronment, and they lack the flexibility necessary to allow government to
respond to very serious practical problems without sacrificing the free





153. Id. at 252-53.
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exchange of ideas the First Amendment is designed to protect. 154
Justice Breyer emphasizes that the Court has throughout its history adapted
First Amendment principles so that they can be properly applied to balance
competing interests according to the particular circumstances.1 55
Justice Breyer frames the issue in the communication cases as there
being at least two competing interests. While there is clearly a First
Amendment interest involved in any case restricting communications, Jus-
tice Breyer acknowledges that this is not the complete picture. 156 In every
case, there is some other interest competing with the First Amendment
right. Justice Breyer's approach considers each interest to be valid and
attempts to look at the totality of the circumstances in order to ascertain
whether a restriction on speech is constitutional.
After identifying the interests, Justice Breyer balances them by con-
sidering whether or not the statute has determined the "proper fit.' 157 To
answer this question, in Justice Breyer's view, requires two considerations:
"[1] whether there are significantly less restrictive ways to achieve Con-
gress' ... objectives, and... [2] whether the statute, in its effort to achieve
those objectives, strikes a reasonable balance between potentially speech-
restricting and speech-enhancing consequences."' 158 To find a statute un-
constitutional under Justice Breyer's approach, a restriction on speech must
be determined to be disproportionate to the benefits gained by the compet-
ing interest "and the extent of these benefits, as well as the need for the
restrictions in order to secure those benefits." 159
This section will now look at a couple of cases where Justice Breyer
implemented his balancing approach to First Amendment cases. The first
case where Justice Breyer introduces his form of analysis is Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.160 This case
involved "First Amendment challenges to three statutory provisions that
[sought] to regulate the broadcasting of 'patently offensive' sex-related
material on cable television." 161 In evaluating the challenged provisions,
Justice Breyer rejected both the adoption a categorical standard that had
been developed for other contexts, as well as an approach which analogizes
154. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996).
155. Id. at 740-41.
156. Id. at 743.
157. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997).
158. Id.
159. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001).
160. 518 U.S. 727.
161. Id. at 732.
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to other contexts so strict scrutiny could be applied. 162
In his consideration of one of the provisions at issue, 163 Justice Breyer
identified all of the interests involved: "[1] protecting children from expo-
sure to patently offensive depictions of sex. . . [2] interests of programmers
in maintaining access channels and [3] of cable operators in editing the
contents of their channels." 164 After identifying the interests, Justice Breyer
performed a balance analysis. He noted that the Court has previously found
the protection of children from sexual material to be a compelling justifica-
tion for restrictions. 165 He then pointed out that the provision has arose in a
"particular context," Congress granted path of access for local and public
channels to be shown by cable operators, and this new provision gave the
cable operators authority to regulate the programming. 1
66
The First Amendment interests involved are therefore complex, and re-
quire a balance between those interests served by the access require-
ments themselves (increasing the availability of avenues of expression to
programmers who otherwise would not have them), and the disadvantage
to the First Amendment interests of cable operators and other program-
mers (those to whom the cable operator would have assigned the chan-
nels devoted to access). 
16 7
After considering the totality of the circumstances, Justice Breyer found the
statute to be constitutional because it protected children from sexual mate-
rials "while accommodating both the First Amendment interests served by
the access requirements and those served in restoring to cable operators a
degree of the editorial control that Congress removed."
168
While Justice Breyer was writing for the Court in Denver Area Educa-
tional Telecommunications Consortium, his mode of interpretation has not
been adopted by the other members. In the next case to be considered, Jus-
tice Breyer filed a concurring opinion; while he agreed with the Court's
determination as to the constitutionality of the statute, he did not agree with
their reasoning. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,169 the Court
considered must-carry statutes, which provided that cable operators must
carry local stations in its broadcasts to homes with cable television.
Justice Breyer agreed with the conclusion of the Court that the statute
162. Id. at 739-40.
163. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 106 STAT. 1486 § 10(a)
(permitting the operator to decide whether or not to broadcast such programs on leased access chan-
nels). (emphasis added); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 733.
164. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 728.
165. Id. at 743.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 743-44. (internal citations omitted).
168. Id. at 747.
169. 520 U.S 180, 186 (1997).
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was constitutional because "it advances important governmental interests
unrelated to the suppression of free speech and [it] does not burden sub-
stantially more speech than necessary to further those interests." 170 How-
ever, Justice Breyer based his conclusion upon different considerations
than the Court. Justice Breyer cited what the Court stated about the stat-
ute's purpose of "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local
broadcast television, and (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources." 171 It is from these purposes
that Justice Breyer identified one set of First Amendment interests in con-
flict in this case: to prevent the decline of quality and quantity of television
choices for non-cable customers which reflects the "basic tenet of national
communications policy, namely, that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel-
fare of the public."' 172 The distribution of this type of information is ger-
mane to informed deliberation and discussion, and such debate is essential
to the democratic process and is thus a value the First Amendment seeks to
promote. 173
Justice Breyer pitted this interest against those of the cable operators.
The cable operators were facing suppression of speech with the implemen-
tation of the must-carry statute. 174 The statute interfered with their ability
"to choose their own programming; it prevents displaced cable program
providers from obtaining an audience; and it will sometimes prevent some
cable viewers from watching what, in its absence, would have been their
preferred set of programs."'1 75 Justice Breyer considered both of these in-
terests to determine what he considers the "key question," whether or not
the statute has determined the "proper fit."' 176
To answer this question, in Justice Breyer's view, requires two con-
siderations: "[1] whether there are significantly less restrictive ways to
achieve Congress' over-the-air programming objectives, and... [2]
whether the statute, in its effort to achieve those objectives, strikes a rea-
sonable balance between potentially speech-restricting and speech-
enhancing consequences."' 177 Once again, Justice Breyer concluded that the
speech-restricting aspects of the statute are limited and thus, the statute is
170. Id. at 225 (Breyer, J., concurring).
171. Id. at226.
172. Id. at 226-27 (internal citations omitted).
173. Id. at 227.
174. Id. at 185.
175. Id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring).
176. Id. at227.




VI. BALANCING PARENTAL AND STUDENT RIGHTS
The Florida flag statute intersects two sets of rights, namely, the rights
of parents and the rights of students. In enacting this statute, the Florida
legislature asserted what it believes to be the proper balance of these rights.
This section will suggest a balance of parental and child rights based upon
Justice Breyer's approach to First Amendment interpretation and the cases
considered in Section III.
The first step to applying Justice Breyer's approach is to reject the tra-
ditional approach of clear and present danger. Barnette set out the clear and
present danger test as applicable to students being compelled to say the
Pledge of Allegiance. 179 Under this, students could not be compelled to
perform the Pledge unless refraining from participation in the salute and
Pledge "present[ed] a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State
is empowered to prevent and punish."180 This showing was not made in
Barnette and the statute was found unconstitutional. While this standard
may be appropriate in cases, like many of those discussed in Part II, where
it is the government infringing the rights of a citizen, it is less appropriate
in cases with competing interests of different groups of citizens.
Under this standard, it would have to be shown that there was a clear
and present danger to parents' right to control the upbringing of their child
in order for the statute to be constitutional. It is unlikely that this standard
would be met; a student sitting quietly at her or his desk at school while
others are saying the Pledge of Allegiance is not an act that presents a clear
and present danger to parents' interests in the upbringing of their children.
The child choosing to abstain from participation in the Pledge of Alle-
giance is not something that could be seen as an act of the school or gov-
ernment which attempts to override the parent's right. Parents' lack of
control over this single action would not result in the school or government
asserting other infringements on parental control, nor can it be said that
allowing the student the freedom to choose in this instance would result in
a loss of parental control in other areas.
The clear and present danger test is inappropriate in this context be-
cause it is too strict and too narrow. Requiring a clear and present danger
indicates that one right is more important than another. Under this standard,
178. Id. at228-29.
179. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
180. Id.
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it is assumed that the student's First Amendment Rights are the interest the
government should be most concerned about protecting. This is assumed
without considering what parental interests are even involved. In order to
determine whether the proper balance has been struck in the Florida statute
under consideration in Fraizer, one must acknowledge that both sets of
rights are equally important in the abstract, and then after considering how
the purpose of each one is advanced or inhibited by the statute, choosing
where the proper balance lies.
The next step in applying Justice Breyer's approach is to identify the
rights in competition. As previously stated, on one side of the equation
there is the students' right to be free from compelled speech, and on the
other there is parents' right to control the upbringing of their children. After
the identification of the interests involved, the proper fit must be deter-
mined. The goal of this section is to determine whether the speech-
restricting aspect of the Florida statute, which prohibits students from as-
serting their right to be free from compelled speech, is proportionate to the
proclaimed remedy/speech-enhancing aspects of the statute, securing par-
ents' say in and control of their child's upbringing.
This note has shown that student rights have been defined rather
broadly by the courts. Students have an affirmative right to free speech as
well as a right to be free from compelled speech. In establishing these
rights, the courts have looked to lofty goals for justification. Students are
the future of society, and the school's role is to prepare them to participate
fully as citizens when adults. Schools are to be a market place of ideas;
there should be few limits on what a student can say, and there is even less
tolerance for what a student can be compelled to say. By protecting stu-
dents' First Amendment rights, it is hoped that young citizens will develop
the skills to engage in discourse. It is hoped that students will be able to
look at the world critically and be a positive part of the political commu-
nity. The ability to think freely and promote one's own ideas is one of the
foundations of a healthy democracy. This idea would be in line with what
Justice Breyer views to be democracy enhancing activities. As described
above, Justice Breyer sees one of the main values of the First Amendment
to be the promotion of the exchange of ideas.
The parental right to the control the upbringing of one's children also
has a long history in the courts. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, parents
have a liberty interest in the nature, care, and custody of their children. 181
181. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recog-
nized by this Court.").
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This idea has been considered to have broad implications over the counsel-
ing of children on important decisions. This right is also important to the
future of the nation; families are the basic building blocks of society.
Strong families produce good citizens, and it is the role of parents to guide
their children to make correct choices. This need for parental oversight is of
utmost importance when the decision to be made has possible life-long
implications. Parents will look out for the welfare of their children "whose
immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair
their ability to exercise their rights wisely. ' 182 Inherit in the acceptance of
the existence of these parental rights is the overriding of minors' rights in
certain instances.
The extent of parental rights over a child's decisions has been prem-
ised on the idea of a minor's inability to make mature decisions. Parents are
allowed to step in and make decisions for children that have potential-life
altering effects. It is presumed that parents will take the child's best interest
into consideration and will choose what is best for them. The question in
the context of Pledge statutes is whether or not this parental guidance and
oversight is justified.
Part III of this note looked at the balance struck between minor and
parental rights in the context of abortion notification laws, a balance that is
inappropriate to the context of Pledge statutes. The courts in those cases
correctly recognized that the choice to have an abortion is different from
other choices a minor has to face.18 3 An abortion has potential life-long
effects, and it requires a mature deliberation process that not every minor
possesses. But is a decision of this nature truly analogous to the decision to
abstain from participation in the Pledge of Allegiance? Almost certainly
not; the choice to not say the Pledge is radically different from that of hav-
ing an abortion. The permanence, time limits, and impact of the two deci-
sions are striking differences, to name a few.
First, the choice is not permanent. A child could reverse her or his de-
cision not to participate in the Pledge. Secondly, there is no time limit on
making the decision. While there is only a limited window in which a mi-
nor can choose to have an abortion, there are no such limitations on partici-
pation in the Pledge of Allegiance. The Pledge is recited daily in public
schools by children in kindergarten to twelfth grade. The lack of urgency
permits time for discussion, that is, time to convince a minor of the virtue
of saying the Pledge so the minor can voluntarily change her or his mind.
182. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 326 (2006) (quoting Hodg-
son v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990)).
183. See supra Part IlI.
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Lastly, a child's choice to not say the Pledge of Allegiance does not have
the potential impact that an abortion does. An abortion could have serious
implications on a minor's psychological and physical health. These impli-
cations are not present when abstaining from the Pledge of Allegiance;
while it is conceivable that a child who chooses not to say the Pledge may
be teased or ridiculed by other students, the potential psychological trauma
would not be of the same magnitude. Further, since the child was exercis-
ing her or his own choice to not say the Pledge, she or he could also choose
whether not saying it was worth the trouble.
As demonstrated in Section III, even in the case of abortion, the courts
only give parents the right to be informed as to what is going on with the
minor; it does not give the parent absolute control over what the minor will
do. 184 While parents can refuse to consent to the abortion of a minor's
child, the minor is entitled to judicial review. 185 It is feasible that this same
form of judicial review could be set up in the context of Pledge statutes. A
minor could petition a court to grant her or him the right to abstain from
participating in the Pledge of Allegiance over her or his parents' objections.
However, before this type of system can be sanctioned, it must first be
determined that the exercise of parental veto is proper in this context. And,
as argued in the previous paragraph, this is not the type of decision that
warrants parental interference.
Under Justice Breyer's approach, the requirement of parental consent
in the context of excusing a child from reciting the Pledge of Allegiance
should be found to be unconstitutional. The general justifications for paren-
tal intervention are not present in this context. A student's choice to abstain
from reciting the Pledge of Allegiance is unlikely to have a significant life-
long impact, nor is it clear that allowing a student to abstain from saying
the Pledge of Allegiance at school would result in disruption of the par-
ent/child relationship in the home. Given the substantial interference paren-
tal consent would have on a student's First Amendment rights and the
minimal interference allowing a student to choose for herself or himself
whether or not to pledge would have on parental control, the statute re-
stricts free speech in a way disproportionate to the harm caused.
184. See supra Part III.
185. See supra Part III, and the cases cited therein.
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